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ONLY  A FEW months  after  the Berlin  Wall  came down in the fall of 1989, 
the West German  government  decided that it should establish a cur- 
rency union  with East Germany.  I Shortly  thereafter,  the West and East 
German  governments  agreed  to economic, monetary,  and social union. 
By July 1991,  the State Treaty, which formalized  the union, came into 
force; by October, the German  Democratic  Republic ceased to exist. 
Left on the agenda is the task of rebuilding  the eastern German  econ- 
omy. But by now, the initial enthusiasm  accompanying  the fall of the 
wall has all but vanished.  Today, western  Germans  balk  at the vast cost 
of reconstructing  the East and even doubt  that the task can be done. In 
eastern Germany, which functions as a welfare colony of its richer, 
western neighbor,  the initial  support  for the market  economy has been 
replaced  by cynicism, if not outright  hostility. Calls for an even more 
active role of the state in sustaining  eastern German  industry  increas- 
ingly  gain  adherents. 
The progress  and the obstacles that lie ahead are the subject of this 
paper.  George  Akerlof  and  others  opened  the subject  with  a diagnosis  of 
the transition  problem  (they called it a Keynesian depression)  and ad- 
vanced a bold policy proposal:  an across-the-board,  substantial  labor 
For helpful  comments,  we are indebted  to our discussant, Lewis Alexander,  and to 
members  of the Brookings  panel,  especially  Lawrence  Summers,  William  Nordhaus,  and 
Robert  Barro. 
1. Throughout  this  paper,  West  Germany  and  "the  West"  and  East  Germany  and  "the 
East"  are  used synonymously. 
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subsidy.2  We pick up the topic from a somewhat  different  perspective. 
We ask what  makes  eastern  Germany  special compared  to other transi- 
tion economies. First  we provide  an update  on the progress  of economic 
union.  Then  we examine  estimates  of how rapidly  eastern  Germany  can 
expect to grow. We address the now popular  question of how long it 
will take eastern Germany to  reach western German standards of 
productivity. 
We are optimistic about the prospects for eastern German  growth. 
But can one be equally  optimistic  about  western Germany,  which must 
foot the bill?  The concluding  section addresses  that question. 
Current Economic Conditions in Eastern Germany 
The availability  of western German  support  provides eastern Ger- 
many  with  the most  favorable  fundamentals  for a rapid  transition.  Partly 
offsetting  these advantages  is the presence  of a rich  brother  that  will un- 
derwrite the social security system, thus creating an incentive to in- 
crease wages ahead of productivity.  This section reviews the interplay 
of these factors since 1989.  The discussion serves as a background  for 
an evaluation  of the growth  opportunities  in unified  Germany.3 
Institutions 
The eastern German  experience is unique among transition  econo- 
mies because the country inherited  not only a complete set of institu- 
tions appropriate  to advanced  industrial  countries,  but  also access to ex- 
perienced  administrators  to run  those institutions.  Among  these imports 
are  a legal  system, including  a body of commercial  law, a system of prop- 
erty  rights,  and  a set of courts;  a social system, including  unemployment 
compensation  and a pension system with immediate  entitlements  for 
qualified  recipients;  a hard  currency,  a system of public  finance, and a 
banking  system with branches  that opened virtually  immediately  after 
2. Akerlof  and  others  (1991). 
3. In 1991,  eastern  Germany's  GDP  was 7.4 percent  of western  Germany's;  labor  pro- 
ductivity  was 29.6 percent  of western  German  levels; and  population  was about  one-quar- 
ter of western  Germany's.  Statistiches  Bundesamt  Wiesbaden,  Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.1, 
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unification;  decentralized  government  authority;  accounting systems; 
free trade  access throughout  Europe;  and strong  political  parties. 
Two special  features  facilitated  the introduction  of these institutions. 
First, unification  created  a legal union  and thus dispensed  with the sov- 
ereignty  issue that  typically  stands  in the way of the wholesale  importing 
of institutions.  Second, the common  institutional  history  meant  that  the 
new institutions  could build  on existing structures  in many  cases. 
Is the importing  of institutions  in fact a blessing?  One  could  argue  that 
a less complicated legal system-particularly in the area of property 
rights-or  somewhat  less stringent  conditions  for construction  permits 
might  have been more suitable  for a rapid  transition.  On  balance  (except 
in the area of restitution  of property  to previous owners), the gains po- 
tentially  to be obtained  from fine tuning  the imported  legal institutions 
clearly outweigh the disadvantages. The sheer existence of market- 
proven institutions greatly enhances the prospects for privatization. 
Were  eastern  Germany  trying  to create its own institutions,  as Ukraine 
is attempting  to do, results  would  occur much  more  slowly and  probably 
be far  worse. Specifically,  home-grown  institutions  carry  a risk  of popu- 
lism that  could make  the business environment  unattractive. 
In two areas the transition  policy clearly failed, however. First, all 
debts  were not eliminated  at the outset. Debts mar  the balance  sheets of 
firms  and  banks  and  complicate  the restructuring  process and  privatiza- 
tion  negotiations.  A unique  opportunity  existed to start  with  a clean slate 
by canceling  enterprise  debt; creating  public debt to balance  bank bal- 
ance sheets; and retiring  debt with the additional  revenues obtained  by 
selling  enterprises  that  were debt-free  rather  than  heavily indebted. 
The second and more serious difficulty  surrounds  the treatment  of 
property  rights  and  restitution  to previous  owners. The decision  to allow 
previous  owners to reclaim  real estate and assets still stands  in the way 
of a swifter  restructuring  process. The existence of more than one mil- 
lion claims, and not infrequently  five, ten, or even fifteen claimants  to 
the same asset, foreshadows  years and years of sorting  out the restitu- 
tion  problem-unless a dramatic  cut is made. But it may  now be too late 
for such a cut, although  some attempts  are being made. Priority  is being 
given to new owners who invest. Even that status is not beyond chal- 
lenge. Property  rights  that  are  not clearly  defined  interfere  with  efforts  to 
rebuild  the economy. The remaining  claims  on real  estate and  residential 
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those structures,  increasing  social expenditures  and making  migration 
more  attractive. 
The approach  taken toward restitution  offers another special diffi- 
culty: it amounts  to a de facto expropriation  from eastern German  citi- 
zens, thereby lowering  even further  their chance of matching  western 
Germans  in terms  of assets. 
In both  the treatment  of property  rights  and  the cancellation  of debts, 
the Germans'  unwillingness  to look forward  and  let bygones be bygones 
was a grave  mistake.4 
Wages and Productivity 
George  Akerlof  and his colleagues noted that the debate on conver- 
sion in relation  to wages largely  missed  the most essential  point-the  be- 
havior  of unions.5  In no time, unions in the West (and in the East) por- 
trayed  wage parity  as the target  and  early  convergence  as the objective, 
regardless  of eastern  German  productivity  levels. 
A less favorable  conversion rate thus would have led to more wage 
inflation,  but with the same endpoint. Wages ultimately  would be the 
same-either higher  in the beginning  because of favorable  conversion  or 
lower at the start  but rising  more  thereafter.  The adjustment  might  have 
taken  a bit longer,  but politics would  have been less favorable  and  infla- 
tion  would  have  been more  of an issue. An immediate  and  sharp  increase 
in relative  wage dispersion  would have added  to the troubles.  All things 
considered,  wage pressure  is a severe problem,  but unions and geogra- 
phy, rather  than  the conversion  rate, are to blame. The East could have 
done without the introduction  and integration  of unions from western 
Germany. 
Because of the initial conversion and wage increases since unifica- 
tion, eastern German  wages in many sectors now exceed 50 percent of 
western German  wage levels. In fact, hourly  compensation  already  ex- 
ceeds U.S. wages in many sectors, including  chemicals, textiles, and 
electrical  machinery.  Table 1 provides  data  on eastern  German  wages. 
While  wages have quickly moved to reach half the western German 
4.  When  the time comes for Cuba  to leave communism  behind,  these lessons should 
be remembered. 
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Table 1.  Wages in Eastern Germany 
Percent 
Percent of  Percent of 
Sector  value addeda  Western  German  wageb 
All sectors  ...  50 
Manufacturing  138  43 
Chemical  industry  211  33 
Machinery  102  40 
Metal  759  49 
Garments  214  67 
Commerce  ...  54 
Construction  ...  74 
Source:  Wocheniberichlt  5-6192 (January 30,  1992), p. 54. 
a.  Wages as percent of value added are for the second  half of  1990. 
b.  Wages as percent of western  German wages  are for  1991. 
level and  are  on the way to parity,  productivity  is low relative  to western 
German  standards.  Exact comparisons  are not available,  but on the ba- 
sis of GDP per worker, eastern German  productivity  is only one-third 
that of western Germany.  Hourly compensation  and GDP per worker 
are shown in table 2. The eastern German  productivity  level resembles 
Mexico's or Korea's, while the wage level matches that of the United 
States  and  already  is ten times  greater  than  that  of the neighboring  Czech 
and  Slovak  Federal  Republic.  Such a discrepancy  is obviously  not a rec- 
ipe for economic success. Overly high real wages were an important 
source  of unemployment  in Europe  during  the 1980s,  according  to a vol- 
ume edited by Robert  Lawrence  and Charles  Schultze.6  How can east- 
ern Germany  escape high unemployment  with such an extreme mis- 
alignment  between productivity  and labor  compensation? 
Employment and  Unemployment 
Since the fall of 1989,  one out of t'hree  workers-some  3 million  peo- 
ple-have  lost theirjobs.  The largest  decline  was in the industrial  sector; 
there,  more  than 1.7 millionjobs  were lost. In all,  jobs were lost in every 
branch  of economic  activity.7 
6. Lawrence  and  Schultze  (1987). 
7. For a discussion  of the German  labor  markets,  see Scheremet  (1992), Scheremet 
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Table 2.  Wages and Productivity in Selected Countries 
Index: United States =  100 
Manufacturing  GDP per 
Country  wages  worker 
Germany 
Western  146  70 
Eastern  66a  23a 
United States  100  100 
Japan  86  65 
Korea  26  33 
Portugal  25  31 
Mexico  12  39 
Poland  7a  21 
Hungary  7a  30 
Sources:  Wages are hourly compensation  in manufacturing in 1990 in U.S.  dollars, from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(1991). Estimates  of GDP per worker in 1985 international prices from Summers and Heston  (1991). 
a.  Authors'  calculation  based on  1991 results. 
Most of the people who are no longer  employed  have become unem- 
ployed, of course. Table  3 presents  more  information  about  unemployed 
workers  in eastern  Germany.  For a while, short-time  work  disguised  the 
extent of unemployment,  but by January  1992, more than 1.3 million 
workers  were unemployed.  Public  work  programs  and  continued  short- 
time work accounted for almost another 1 million  jobs. But the labor 
force declined  significantly-by more  than 1 million  workers-as  work- 
ers migrated,  commuted,  or chose early  retirement.  In addition,  the par- 
ticipation  rate of females in the labor force-previously  the highest in 
the world-declined significantly. 
Output and Transfers 
Since 1989,  measured  real  GDP  in eastern  Germany  has fallen  42 per- 
cent. Only toward the end of 1991  did the first fragile signs of a turn- 
around  appear.  The drop  in real GNP has a number  of explanations:  the 
most important  are the loss of cost-competitiveness  and the dramatic 
shift of demand  to imports,  induced  by the sudden, unrestricted  access 
to Western  goods, coupled with generous income transfers.  The com- 
plete and  radical  import  liberalization,  reinforced  by the marketing  skills 
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Table 3.  Open and Disguised Unemployment in Eastern Germany, 1991-92 
Thousands of workers 
1991  1992 
Employment  status  Fourth quarter  January  Februamy 
Total not at worka  2,058  ...  ... 
Unemployed  1,037  1,343  1,290 
Short-time workers  1,113  521  519 
Work program  357  394  400 
Education  90  77  103 
Others not employed 
in eastern Germany' 
Migrants  382  ...  ... 
Commuters  482  ...  ... 
Early retirees  661 
Source:  Wochenberichlt  12-13192 (March 19, 1992), p.  134, and Monatsberichte  der Deutschen  Bundesbanik, March 
1992. 
a.  In computing  the  total,  figures for  short-time  workers  are weighted  by  the  amount  of  time  spent  out  of  the 
workplace. 
b.  The increase  in migrants, commuters,  and early retirees  since fourth quarter 1989 is shown. 
houses) led to a situation  where imports  increased  even above the level 
of GDP, as shown  in figure  1. The decline  in demand  for goods produced 
in eastern Germany,  reinforced  by disorganization  on the supply side, 
resulted in a sharp output contraction, especially in industry. (See 
table  4.) 
While  output  and employment  declined  dramatically,  massive trans- 
fers from  western  Germany  to eastern  Germany  immediately  raised  the 
standard  of living and started financing  the reconstruction. In 1991, 
these transfers  totaled 139  DM, an extraordinary  three-quarters  of GNP 
in eastern  Germany  and 5.5 percent of GNP in the West. This is more 
than twice the percentage  of GNP that the United States spent on the 
Marshall  Plan. The Bundesbank  estimates that these internal  transfers 
will climb to 180 billion DM in 1992.8 
Transfers  of this magnitude  help explain  why the collapse in produc- 
tion and the sharp  increase in unemployment  did not translate  into an 
even worse cumulative  depression  than  in fact has occurred. 
8.  Monatsberichte der Deutschen  Bundesbank, March 1992. 242  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Figure 1.  Real GDP and Trade in Eastern Germany, Third Quarter 1989 to Fourth 
Quarter 1991 
Billions of 1990: 2H deutsche marks, quarterly  rated 
70  - 
GDP 
60  - 
Imports 
50  - 
40  /1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 
30 -  ,.......  Expots.  20~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~J 
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source: Wochlenbericht,  various  issues. 
Commuting and Migration 
In eastern  Germany  today, family  incomes equal nearly  55 to 60 per- 
cent of western German  levels. Nearly 30 percent of the labor  force is 
unemployed,  when short-time  work and  jobs programs  are factored  in. 
Migration,  or at least commuting,  would seem to be an obvious solution 
to unemployment. 
In fact, commuting  is flourishing:  nearly  one-half  million  eastern  Ger- 
man residents work in the West. With an average commuting  time of 
only 40 minutes, this number  could double or triple. In western Ger- 
many, 39  percent  of the  labor  force commutes;  nearly  70 percent  of com- 
muters  travel 10  to 50 kilometers.9  Eastern  Germans  will find  that  in the 
coming  years, commuting  may strike  the best balance  between earnings 
and the cost of living. Commuting  doubles earnings  without  adding  the 
large  extra cost of housing  in western  Germany. 
9.  See Wochenbericht 3192 (January  17, 1992),  p. 23. Rudiger Dornblusch and Holger  Wolf  243 
Table 4.  Eastern German Macroeconomic Indicators,  1989-91 
Billions  of real deutsche marks,  except where noteda 
Indicator  1989  1990  1991 
Real GNP  281.2  235.9  163.7 
Imports  63.4  117.0  218.7 
Consumption  155.1  164.9  173.1 
Disposable  income 
(percent of GDP)  .  .  .  79.1  112.1 
Source:  Wocheniberict  33/91 (August  15, 1991) and Wochlenibericht  7/92 (February  13, 1992). 
a.  The real DM are at constant  1990:2H prices. 
Migration  decisions reflect cost-benefit analysis involving employ- 
ment opportunities  and income prospects. Akerlof and his colleagues 
make  the point  that  unemployment  is the overriding  reason  for migration 
decisions.  '0 This is borne  out to some extent by a panel  survey  in eastern 
Germany,  as shown in table 5. 
Three points emerge from this inquiry. First, few people have con- 
crete plans  to move. Second, about  half  of the males surveyed  will con- 
template  moving in the long term. That is an extremely large number; 
exactly how to evaluate  it is difficult  to know. Presumably  it means  that 
if things  do not work out, then workers  may contemplate  moving. That 
is a far cry from actually moving. Finally, further  data (not reported) 
show that about half of employed workers  are willing  to move. Among 
homeowners,  only one-third  are willing  to migrate  in the medium  term. 
Privatization 
Eastern German  privatization  is progressing  at an extremely rapid 
pace. By now, some 30 companies  a week are going  private.  At the out- 
set, the privatization  agency, the Treuhand,  had to dispense with 9,000 
industrial  businesses, 45,000 establishments,  20,000 commercial  busi- 
nesses, 7,500 hotels and restaurants,  1,000  pharmacies,  and numerous 
bookshops and cinemas. In addition, the agency was responsible for 
vast holdings  of land  and  for 3 million  jobs. By February  1992,  5,500 in- 
dustrial  firms  had been sold (or closed).  "I  As part  of the sales strategy, 
10. Akerlof  and  others  (1991). 
11. In the process  of privatization,  the giant  conglomerates,  or Kombinate,  were split 
up, causing  the number  of firms  to increase  significantly. 244  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Table 5.  Eastern German Workers' Willingness to Migrate in the Short 
and Medium Term 
Percent of male population below  age 49 
Willingness  to migrate 
Employment  status  Short term  Medium  term 
Total  4.9  50.2 
Full-time employed  4.6  47.9 
Short-time workers  2.2  46.1 
Unemployed  7.4  59.2 
Commuters  9.3  61.9 
Source:  Wochleniber  ichlt 5-6192 (January 30,  1992), p. 60. 
potential  buyers had to submit  employment  and investment  plans cov- 
ered  by guarantees.  To date, the privatization  process has  led to employ- 
ment guarantees  for more than 1 million  workers  and investment  com- 
mitments  of DM 140  billion. 
Of course, privatization  is far  from  complete. Some 5,000  companies 
still must be sold. It is only a question of time before most are sold or 
closed. However, some firms  pose difficult  regional  questions. It is not 
clear whether  the government  wants to protect  jobs as a regional  policy 
or as just a way to sustain  workers'  incomes. That  problem  is no differ- 
ent from the regional  problems  associated with declining  industries  in 
western  Germany  and  other  European  economies. 
The special feature of eastern Germany's privatization  is that the 
overriding  majority  of industrial  firms  sold have been bought  by foreign- 
ers in western Germany  and other countries.'2  Moreover, most firms 
were sold to enterprises  that operate in the same or similar  industries. 
This situation  differs  radically  from  one in which domestic  residents  be- 
come owners and managers.  The predominance  of foreign investment 
brings with it immediate  access to capital, technology, management, 
markets,  and brand  names. The privatization  mechanism,  with its em- 
phasis  on selling  to the West, thus  has provided  an immediate  and strong 
infusion  of market  skills and state-of-the-art  technology at the level of 
the firm. 
Banks have played no significant  part in the privatization  process. 
But the western German  banking  system immediately  expanded  to the 
12. However, foreigners  have not been the main buyers of shops, restaurants,  and 
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East on the coattails  of the Bundesbank.  With  a banking  system that  has 
secured  access to the world  capital  market  in place, the East should  not 
find  it difficult  to finance  further  investments  in new small  and medium- 
size firms. 
Growth and Convergence 
As the East faces mass unemployment,  low productivity,  and mas- 
sive  transfers, the question naturally arises where its  economy is 
headed. One of the biggest factors is productivity. Eastern Germany 
productivity  is at about one-third  of western German  levels. However, 
in terms  of income, the gap  is only one-half  and  narrowing.  What  are the 
prospects for productivity  improvements?  Is it plausible  that much of 
the difference in per capita output between eastern and western Ger- 
many can be made up over the next 10 or 15 years? If not, transfers 
would  have to last indefinitely  or major  migration  would  be the response 
to lasting  differences  in opportunity. 
Two possibilities  exist. One is that the situation  of eastern Germany 
is no different  from any other catch-up situation  and thus follows the 
"law  of convergence"  at the rate  of 2 percent  per year  presented  by Rob- 
ert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin.'3  Another possibility is that the 
Eastern  European  transition  economies in general  and the eastern  Ger- 
man situation  in particular  is characterized  by a number  of special ad- 
vantages. Specifically,  high  levels of education  and geographic  proxim- 
ity may  facilitate  the transfer  of skills  and  technology. If so, the opening 
of Eastern  Europe  presents  a different  situation  from  countries  like Bra- 
zil or Malaysia  that are catching  up to the industrialized  world. More- 
over, if political  integration  removes risk factors and information  costs 
and firms receive massive subsidization, why shouldn't investment 
rates  rise extravagantly? 
Finally,  we should  note that  if productivity  grows  rapidly,  unemploy- 
ment  almost  certainly  will increase  sharply.  Thus  good productivity  per- 
formance  in the early years is bound  to be a mixed blessing  for Eastern 
European economies. 
13. Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1991). 246  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Pessimistic  Views of Convergence 
Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  have offered a dismal outlook for the con- 
vergence of eastern and western Germany.  Drawing  on their findings 
of convergence in a large cross section of regions and countries, they 
conclude that "it would take 35 years for half of the initial East-West 
gap to be eliminated.  Thus, the results extrapolated  from our findings 
for regions of the United States and Europe and for a variety of coun- 
tries imply that East Germany's  achieving 'parity' in the short run is 
unimaginable."14 
Barro  further  spells out the dismal  scenario  when, based on the same 
evidence, he observes that the "growth  advantage  (which will decline 
over time as the East closes upon the West) means that it will take ... 
about 70 years to eliminate  three-quarters  of [the gap]. If so, the East 
would eventually catch up to the West, but in a couple of generations 
rather  than  a couple of years or a couple of decades."'5 
A starting  point for the discussion is a mechanical  assessment of the 
relation  between average  compound  growth  and the number  of years to 
raise productivity  (measured  as GDP per capita)  in eastern  Germany  to 
some fraction  of productivity  in western Germany.  Let the initial  ratio 
of productivities  between  eastern  and  western  Germany  be xo  = 0.3. Let 
XT denote the terminal  productivity  ratio,  and  v, the growth  rate  differen- 
tial. Then, 
iT 
( 1  )  XT  =xOe 
The entries in table 6 indicate how long it will take with various 
growth  rate  differentials  between  eastern  and  western  Germany  to reach 
a specified  degree  of convergence  (measured  by the productivity  ratio). 
Note that  to fully converge  in about 15  years would require  a productiv- 
ity growth  differential  of 0.08. Assuming  that western German  produc- 
tivity grows at 2 percent a year, eastern German  productivity  would 
have to grow by 10 percent per year. Is it possible to maintain  such a 
growth  rate? 
The work of Barro  and Sala-i-Martin-which is a systematic  attempt 
14. Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1991,  p. 154). 
15. Robert  Barro,  "Eastern  Germany's  Long  Haul,"  Wall  StreetJournal,  May  3, 1991, 
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Table 6.  Time and Growth Rate Differentials Needed to Achieve Target 
Productivity Ratios 
Years 
Growth  Target  productivity  ratio 
rate 
differential  XT  =  0.8  XT=  0.9  XT  =  1.0 
0.01  98  110  120 
0.02  49  55  60 
0.04  25  28  30 
0.06  16  18  20 
0.08  12  14  15 
0.10  10  1  1  12 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on the equation 
X?  =  xoe' 
where  XT is  the  final productivity  ratio and  v is  the  growth  rate differential.  The  initial productivity  ratio,  xo,  is 
assumed  to be 0.3.  See  text for more information. 
to analyze convergence-implies  it is not possible.'6 They find that 
growth advantages  are small and diminish  as productivity  differences 
narrow.  In their model, the growth  rate differential,  v, is negatively  re- 
lated  to the gap  between a region's  productivity  level, Y,  and  productiv- 
ity in the benchmark  region, Y*: 
(2)  vt =  -  Iln  (Yt.  u/Y*t.  ,). 
They estimate  that 13  equals  0.02. Thus  for an initial  productivity  ratio  of 
0.5, they find  an initial  growth  differential  of 1.4  percent.  Moreover,  this 
already low growth rate declines over time as the productivity gap 
closes. Even with a smaller  productivity  ratio of 0.3, the initial  growth 
differential  would be somewhat  higher-but still only 1.8  percent. East- 
ern German  growth  would start  off around  3.4 to 3.8 percent  a year and 
then gradually  fall off to the western German  growth  rate of 2 percent  a 
year. As shown in table 6, with such small  growth  differentials,  it takes 
more  than  a century  to catch up. 
The application  of the cross-region  evidence to the eastern German 
catchup  is surprising  because no room is left for special factors. At the 
very least, consideration  could be given to an investment  boom outside 
the sample experience. Surprisingly,  Barro and Sala-i-Martin  do not 
16.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). 248  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Table 7.  Effect of Schooling and Investment on Productivity Growth in Selected Eastern 
European Countries 
Percent per year 
Independent  Eastern 
variable  Builgaria  CSFRa  Poland  Hungary  Germany 
Productivity level  0.07  -0.11  0.18  -  0.02  -0.11 
Schooling  -0.01  0.05  0.05  -  0.20  0.11 
Investment  -  0.45  -0.13  -  0.45  -  0.13  1.16 
Total  -0.39  -0.19  -0.22  -0.35  1.15 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on the equation 
A), =  -0.007y  + 0.014p  +  0.020s  +  0.064i, 
where y  is the log of productivity  (GDP per worker), p and s are primary and secondary  school  enrollment  ratios 
(and are added together as the "schooling" variable in the table), and i is the ratio of investment  to GDP. All variables 
are expressed  relative to the mean of the five countries.  The coefficients  are the averages of those obtained by Barro 
(1991, table 4). Labor force and GDP data (in order to get log productivity) are from Handbook of Economic  Statistics, 
1991, and etnrollment  ratios are from UNESCO Statistical  Yearbook, various issues.  The authors assume  that eastern 
German productivity equals that of the CSFR and assume  investment  ratios of 0.15 for Bulgaria and Poland, 0.20 for 
the CSFR and Hungary, and 0.40 for eastern Germany. 
a.  Czech  and Slovak Federal  Republic. 
make  allowances  for this possibility, even as a conjecture.  17 Of course, 
presenting  a quantitative  measure  of the special  "transition  effect"  is dif- 
ficult,  if not impossible. 
A first  attempt  to add some extra factors is to use another  model by 
Barro,  in which growth  in a cross section of countries  is allowed to de- 
pend not only upon convergence, but also upon investment rates and 
country  characteristics.  18  Using an average  of the coefficients  obtained 
by Barro,  the investment  rate  has a coefficient  of 0.064  in a growth  equa- 
tion. This leads to a disappointing  implication:  even an extra 20 percen- 
tage points of GDP in investment  yields only an additional  1.3 percen- 
tage points  growth  a year in productivity. 
Consider  an application  of this equation  to the relative  performances 
of several  Eastern  European  countries.  Assume  investment  rates  of 0. 15 
for Poland  and  Bulgaria,  0.2 for Hungary  and  the Czech and  Slovak  Fed- 
eral  Republic,  and 0.4 for eastern  Germany.  In addition  to letting  initial 
per capita income levels determine  convergence, let schooling and in- 
17. In private  communication,  Robert  Barro  has said  that  he views the case of eastern 
German  catch-up  to be similar  to that  of the southern  United  States catching  up with the 
North,  Italy's  South  catching  up  with  its North,  or depressed  regions  of western  Germany 
catching  up with  the more  advanced  regions.  Barro  observes that  this perspective  is opti- 
mistic because it assumes that ultimately,  the convergence  will be to a high  level of per 
capita  income  like that  of Western  Europe,  rather  than  to a low one like  Romania's. 
18. Barro  (1991). Rudiger Dornbiusch and Holger Wolf  249 
Table 8.  Investment and Productivity Growth in Selected High-Growth Countries 
Percent 
Prodluctivity  Investment  rate  Gap closingb 
relative to the 
Colint,y  U.S. level, 1960a  1950s  1960s  1970s  1950s  1960s  1970s 
Hong  Kong  24.2  . .  .  21.6  20.7  ...  10.4  17.7 
Japan  23.1  17.6  27.7  32.5  8.7  20.0  18.9 
Korea  11.1  . .  .  17.0  29.3  . ..  4.8  8.8 
Singapore  29.8  ...  17.4  34.7  ...  10.6  15.6 
Taiwan  11.7  10.8  17.0  27.3  3.9  7.3  13.0 
Germany  51.9  27.7  29.9  26.7  18.7  12.4  11.0 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from Summers and Heston  dataset,  Mark V.  See  Summers and Heston  (1991). 
a.  The ratio of productivity  in the country relative to productivity in the United  States  in 1960 is shown. 
b.  Gap closing  is the percentage  point reduction in the productivity  gap over the decade. 
vestment  rates  influence  the relative  performance.  Table  7 shows the an- 
nual  growth  rate  differentials  relative  to the average  performance  of the 
five countries,  as predicted  by the Barro  model. 
If transition  and economic union  result  in a higher  investment  rate of 
20 percentage  points of GDP, the contribution  to differential  growth is 
barely above 1 percentage  point a year. That is not negligible, but it 
clearly is not a mechanism  that would move eastern Germany  quickly 
away  from  the Czech and  Slovak  Federal  Republic  or Hungary.  Accord- 
ingly, this evidence does not support  predictions  for rapid  convergence 
between eastern and western Germany,  but rather  reinforces the cau- 
tious view expressed  by Barro  and Sala-i-Martin.  19 
A Comparison with High-Growth  Countries 
A different  approach  is to focus on the countries  whose economies 
have performed  the best and  ask how much  of the productivity  gap they 
were able to close. Experiences  of unusually  high growth  can be found 
in Germany  during  the early postwar period and in Asia, among such 
countries  as Hong Kong, Japan,  Singapore,  South Korea, and Taiwan. 
Table 8 summarizes  the investment rates and productivity  improve- 
ments  in selected high-growth  countries. 
19. Recalculating  the  growth  differential  assuming  productivity  in eastern  Germany  of 
150  percent  of the level for the Czech and Slovak  Federal  Republic  reduces  the figure  to 
0.9 percent  per  year. 250  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Examining  the strongest,  sustained  growth  experiences suggests  that 
eastern  Germany  will not catch up in less than  20 to 30 years. In the best 
two decades, and even with very high investment rates, the best per- 
formers  eliminated  only 20 to 40 percent of the productivity  gap. The 
simple average  of the gap-closing  rates shown in the table is 12.1 per- 
centage  points per decade. Even if we take the average  of the best dec- 
ade for each country-15.6  percent-eastern Germany  still would need 
almost  three  decades to achieve 80 percent  of western German  produc- 
tivity, starting  from  an initial  gap of 70 percent. 
Special  Factors 
To believe that eastern Germany  can reach 80 percent convergence 
in as few as 15 years suggests an experience entirely unlike that of the 
most successful countries in the postwar period. What special factors 
could make such a performance  possible? Unusually  rapid  catch-up  in 
terms of per capita GDP or productivity  would have to result from an 
outstanding  performance  of total  factor  productivity,  an unusually  rapid 
rate  of capital  accumulation,  and  any interaction  between  the two. Thus, 
one would look for aspects of the eastern German  situation  that make 
the experience uniquely favorable, even in the context of regional 
catch-up.20 
We can divide  the eastern  German  growth  process into three  phases. 
First,  for  given technologies  and  factor  supplies,  the shift  to markets  will 
bring  about some improvement  in productivity  as labor hoarding  is re- 
duced, the worst inefficiencies are eliminated, and incentives are re- 
stored. The second stage in growth  derives from the adoption  of better 
technologies. The third  stage follows from increases in factor supplies, 
principally  the capital  stock. 
The first  stage-the  movement  from  the interior  to the frontier  of the 
production  possibility set-produces  similar  productivity  increases for 
all transition  economies. By contrast,  in eastern  Germany,  the extent of 
the adoption  of new technology will far exceed the levels in the other 
20. Some would  see a parallel  with  the U.S. South  and  North  after  the Civil  War.  The 
two regions shared many common factors, including  history and language-yet  the 
South's  catch-up  was desperately  slow. However,  the precedent  is really  not relevant  be- 
cause eastern  Germany  is so small  relative  to western  Germany  and so near  to it. More- 
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post-socialist  economies. The difference  partly  reflects the benefits of 
common language. More importantly,  the gains are a direct conse- 
quence of the Treuhand  privatization  strategy  of selling enterprises  to 
firms  that  operate  in the same or a similar  field. 
Likewise, eastern Germany  will attract  a disproportionate  share of 
investment  in Eastern Europe. Among the reasons are the absence of 
political risk; the massive investment in infrastructure  undertaken  by 
the public sector; the sharp  reduction  in implementation  problems  be- 
cause the administration  has some market  experience;  the availability  of 
inputs  from  Western  markets;  and  free access to the European  Commu- 
nity. In particular,  the Feldstein-Horioka  effect will not affect eastern 
Germany  separately.2'  In addition, eastern Germany  is a natural  loca- 
tion for western  German  firms  to expand. Extensive subsidies  to capital 
formation  in the East-as  high as 50 percent-will  encourage  a signifi- 
cant fraction of capacity expansion. Moreover, the less "green"  atti- 
tudes of population  and  administration  also will attract  investment.  The 
availability  of a large  pool of educated  and generally  skilled  labor  guar- 
antees that capital  accumulation  will not run  into bottlenecks  for a long 
time. 
Taken  together,  the growth  potential  in eastern  Germany  far  exceeds 
the levels realistically  attainable  elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Appar- 
ently no precedent exists for such a potentially dramatic  transfer of 
knowledge  and skills. Accordingly,  one cannot  assert that  simple  osmo- 
sis will enable  eastern  German  labor  to increase  productivity  by, say, 20 
percent.  But it cannot  be denied  that  significantly  greater  contact, expo- 
sure, and communication  differentiate  the eastern German  case from 
standard  convergence situations  and can lead to dramatic  productivity 
increases. 
With  so much  attention  being paid to the potential  for growth  in pro- 
ductivity  during  the transition,  one must not overlook the down side. 
First,  much  of the existing  capital  stock has become economically  obso- 
lete. This is true for four reasons. First, the capital is antiquated.  Sec- 
ond, it is unacceptable  to a society concerned  with environmental  safe- 
21. Feldstein  and Horioka  (1980) showed that national  investment  rates are deter- 
mined  (constrained)  by national  rates  of saving.  The issue here  is whether  for eastern  Ger- 
many  all-German  saving,  rather  than  simply  eastern  German  saving,  is the relevant  con- 
straint.  For  empirical  evidence  of the Feldstein-Horioka  effect, see Dooley, Frankel,  and 
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guards.  Third,  it may be unable  to adjust  to the factor proportions  of a 
high-wage  economy. Lastly, much  of it is located  in sectors or industries 
that are simply  unviable. Eduardo  Borensztein  and Peter Montiel esti- 
mated  that  half  to three-quarters  of investment  in the Czech and Slovak 
Federal  Republic, Hungary,  and Poland  was wasteful. They conclude 
that  "a  large  portion  of the currently  existing  capital  will be of little  value 
in the context of a market  economy. In the past, investment  decisions 
were not made  on the basis of profitability  but instead  were determined 
by central  plan objectives, by the bargaining  power of different  enter- 
prises, and other  non-market  criteria."22  Clearly,  that  judgment  is more 
appropriate  for manufacturing  capital  stock than  for housing  and infra- 
structure. 
The initial  alignment  to a market  economy with a new set of prices 
and  techniques  implies  an immediate  reduction  in GDP  for two reasons: 
environmental  problems  and economic obsolescence (including  the in- 
ability  to sell products  like the quaint  and  inefficient  Trabant  automobile 
at any price).  In eastern  Germany,  the immediate  drop  in per  capita  GDP 
was 40 percent;  this lengthened  the minimum  time until  convergence.23 
A further  negative  factor  is the level of wages:  this sets eastern  Germany 
apart  from the other transition  economies. With wages on the way to 
parity,  capital  intensity  is inevitably  high;  hence the contribution  of in- 
vestment  to growth  is commensurately  low. 
We make no attempt  to quantify  these factors, but they point in two 
directions. When we compare eastern Germany  with other transition 
economies, on the one hand,  eastern  Germany  gets all the advantages  of 
unification  and  thus  a far  better  shot at immediate  productivity  gains  and 
extravagantly  large rates of investment. On the other hand, eastern 
Germany  will suffer disproportionately  large initial losses because of 
tougher  environment  standards  and a very sharp  rise in wages. Most of 
the adjustment  has and  will take  the form  ofjob displacement.  However, 
a good part  of that  unemployment  and  underemployment  is resolved by 
emigration  and commuting.  The rest stands  ready to serve as an ample 
supply  of labor  ready  for investment-led  output  expansion. 
All the Eastern European  transition  economies should reap a one- 
time productivity  gain that derives from their unusual isolation. The 
22. Borensztein  and  Montiel  (1992,  pp. 154-55). 
23. Here  is an instance  where  better  GNP  accounting,  including  environmental  depre- 
ciation,  would  clearly  make  sense. Rludiger  Dornbusch and Holger  Wolf  253 
more easily a country  can gain access to and implement  foreign  knowl- 
edge and  can attain  an efficient  international  division  of labor,  the larger 
these gains  will be. 
In terms of income, eastern Germany  is well on the way to conver- 
gence with western  Germany.  Massive  transfers  will sustain  that  result. 
However, in terms  of productivity,  the gap is still very large. Estimates 
of the investment  required  to achieve 80 percent equalization  over the 
next decade  are as large  as DM 1  trillion.24  Any estimates  are highly  ten- 
tative:  a higher  growth  rate  of total  factor  productivity  could sharply  re- 
duce investment  requirements.  But for the time being, the investment 
outlook is highly promising.  Already, investment has increased from 
24.8 percent  of GNP in 1990  to 37.4 percent  in 1991,  worth  some DM 72 
billion. 
In the immediate  future, investment  growth  is likely at least to keep 
pace with GNP growth;  thus for quite a while, record  investment  rates 
can  be expected. In the next 15  years, chances are good that  the produc- 
tivity gap will narrow dramatically.  However, the western German 
growth  rate  is likely to fall;  this will contribute  to convergence.  Whether 
eastern  Germany  will catch up to France  or proceed  all the way to west- 
ern German  levels is impossible  to predict. That eastern Germany  will 
more closely  resemble western Germany than Portugal is  almost 
certain. 
At this stage, productivity  gains are achieved most easily by closing 
down highly  inefficient  operations.  To the extent that liquidity  loans or 
asset stripping  sustains  employment  inefficiently,  they also will perpetu- 
ate low levels of productivity.  This consideration  highlights  the conflict 
between achieving high productivity  and achieving high employment. 
High productivity  jobs can come from greenfield  investments. Service 
sector growth  adds to employment,  but not at a very high level of pro- 
ductivity. Somewhere in between in terms of productivity  growth is 
plant restructuring  (broadly interpreted  to include improvements in 
technology and investment in plant and equipment,  as well as human 
capital  formation).  The interesting  question is how much of the gain in 
output per worker  during  the next decade will come from investment 
and  how much  from  the residual.  Unification  is more  likely to succeed if 
unusual  reserves  of productivity  growth  exist that  can be unlocked  with- 
out high  rates  of investment. 
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In the short  run, productivity  growth  will do relatively  little for em- 
ployment  (except  by expanding  the service sector).  This conclusion  sug- 
gests that  migration  and  commuting  should  not  be viewed as terrible  out- 
comes; rather, they should be encouraged  to equalize incomes more 
rapidly,  with less unemployment.  The simple  fact is that another 1 mil- 
lion to 2 million  workers moving West would solve the bleak employ- 
ment  outlook  in the East. In the past two years alone, the West created 
almost  that  many  new  jobs by running  a high-pressure  economy. 
The Burden of Unification  on Western Germany 
Unification  has three clear implications  for western Germany.  First, 
burdens  on taxpayers  will be significant.  Second, skilled labor will be 
plentiful  and  hence tension  between a union-dominated  high  wage strat- 
egy and a full employment  strategy  will increase. Of course, increased 
labor market competition will be a clear plus in controlling  inflation. 
Third, investment  in western Germany  certainly  will fall unless major 
budget efforts are forthcoming or Feldstein-Horioka  effects are not 
present at all. The decline in investment in turn puts in question Ger- 
many's ability to sustain high and rising real wages. Some have sug- 
gested that  a peace dividend  should  permit  a rise in after-tax  wages, but 
such a dividend  is hard  to find. 
Short-run Effects 
Unification  came at the tail end of a boom and moved the western 
German  economy into a situation  of overheating  and inflation.  Unifica- 
tion and the transition  increased demand  for western German  goods. 
This  extra  impetus  helped  push  capacity  utilization  to a peak  for the dec- 
ade. Meanwhile,  the unemployment  rate  fell to a level not seen in a dec- 
ade-despite  large immigration.  Table 9 summarizes  macroeconomic 
conditions  in western  Germany. 
Unions responded  to the overheating  labor  market  with demands  for 
wage increases in excess of productivity  growth. Inflation  accelerated 
sharply  and the Bundesbank  raised interest  rates sharply,  as expected. 
The reduction  of extra demand  stimulus  from the East, sustained  tight 
money, and the onset of a solidarity  tax (a 6.5 percent income surtax Rudiger Dornbusch and Holger  Wolf  255 
Table  9. West German  Macroeconomic  Indicators,  1979-93 
Percent  per year, except where indicated 
Indicator  1979-89  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Growth  1.8  3.8  4.5  3.2  1.8  2.5 
Unemployment  rate  5.1  5.6  5.1  4.6  5.0  5.1 
Employment  growth  1.3  1.3  2.6  2.1  1.0  1.0 
Inflation  2.9  3.2  3.4  4.4  4.5  3.9 
Budget deficit 
(percent  of GDP)  -2.1  0.2  -2.5  - 3.7  - 3.5  -2.9 
Source:  OECD Main Economic  Indicators:  Historical  Statistics  and OECD Economic  Outlook,  December  1991. 
Figures for 1992 and 1993 are estimates. 
scheduled  to expire this year) now combine to slow down the German 
economy-and  with it the economy of Europe. In Germany,  the boom 
that preceded these events and high inflation  make high interest rates 
and the slowdown far less of a problem than they are for the rest of 
Europe. 
In budget  terms, the starting  point  for the financing  of unification  was 
exceptionally  favorable. Germany  had worked during  the 1980s  to im- 
prove its fiscal position; the budget  deficit  had been eliminated  and the 
debt ratio had started  declining  from a level that was not high to start 
with. Figure  2 presents  expected public  debt ratios in Germany  and the 
United States. In Germany,  the fiscal outlook has deteriorated  for the 
foreseeable  future  as a result  of unification.  Transfer  payments  will con- 
tinue  for quite  a while. Moreover,  the more ambitious  the wage push in 
the East, the larger  the deficits will be. In fact, Germany's  deficits risk 
building  up a debt  curve not unlike  that  of the United  States in the 1980s. 
Unification  affects the capital  market  two main  ways: through  budget 
deficits  resulting  from transfer  payments, and through  investment  out- 
lays associated  with improving  infrastructure  and  business  formation  in 
the East. Because households  and firms  in the East are not saving, uni- 
fication  requires  massive  borrowing  through  the western  German  capital 
market.  The capital  market  pressure  helps explain  the presence of high 
long-term  real interest  rates implicit  in nominal  yields of 8 percent and 
a declining  inflation  rate. In part  because of pervasive subsidization  of 
investment,  especially in the East, these high long-term  rates have not 
yet slowed  investment  to any major  extent. So far, a major  deterioration 
in the current  account has financed  the increase in demand. Clearly, 256  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Figure 2.  Public Debt Ratios in Germany and the United States, 1980-2002 
Percent  of GDP 
62  - 
60 _-,/'  '' 
58 -  '' 
56 _  ,'/  United  States 
54  - 
52- 
50  -  ," 
48  -  ,/ 
46- 
J/  ~~~~~Germnaniy 
40 -  , 
38  -  ^8 
36- 
3 4F 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002 
Source:  Figures for  1980-1992  are from OECD Economic  Outlook,  December  1991. Thereafter,  the debt  ratio is 
1/1.06 times the previous  year's  debt ratio plus the deficit ratio. For Germany,  the authors assume  a deficit ratio of 
3.5 percent of GDP and 5 percent nominal income growth per year. For the United States,  nominal income is assumed 
to grow by 5 percent per year. For 1992-97,  U.S.  deficit ratios published in the Congressional  Budget Office January 
1992 report, "An Analysis  of  the President's  Budgetary  Proposals  for Fiscal  Year  1993," are used.  Thereafter,  the 
U.S.  deficit ratio is assumed  to be 2.8 percent of GDP. 
though,  capital  and labor  markets  are challenged  beyond their capacity 
to deliver  on all promises  and  expectations.  As Hans Mundorf  argued  in 
a German  newspaper  in March  1992,  "tax  reduction,  debt  consolidation, 
stable money, financing  unification,  moving  the parliament  and  govern- 
ment  back to Berlin,  compensating  Bonn, feeding  the world, expanding 
social and environmental  protection;  all that cannot be done at one and 
the same time because it cannot be financed.  As long as policy makers 
don't set priorities,  nobody has a right  to expect discipline  in wage set- 
tlements.  "25 
25.  Hans Mundorf, "Im Milliardenrausch," Handelsblatt  Wirtschafts-und Finanzzei- 
tung, March  13, 1992  (reprinted  in Deutsche  Bundesbank,  "Auszuige  aus Presseartikeln," 
March  18, 1992,  and  translated  by the authors). Rludiger  Dornbusch and Holger  Wolf  257 
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Evaluating Longer-run Effects 
A starting  point  for generating  and examining  scenarios  and evaluat- 
ing policy is a classical full employment  setting. Figure  3 examines the 
goods market  equilibrium  for Germany  and the rest of the world. The 
transfer between eastern and western Germany-with  consumption 
smoothing  in the East and the incentive  to invest created  by eastern  op- 
portunities-leads to a world  increase  in demand  for goods, focused on 
goods from  Germany. 
In Figure 3, the line labelled GG shows the market  equilibrium  for 
goods in Germany;  line AA shows equilibrium  in the rest of the world. 
Equilibrium  in each market  depends  upon  the world  real  interest  rate, r, 
and  the real exchange  rate, R, defined  as German  prices relative  to for- 
eign prices in a common currency.  The standard  model predicts a real 
appreciation  (a rise in R) in Germany,  a rise in the world real interest 
rate, and a German  current  account deficit.26  This is shown by the shift 
26. See also Alexander  and Gagnon  (1990)  and the simulations  reported  in Lipschitz 
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from equilibrium  point E to E'.  Over time, German  relative potential 
output  expands  as labor  becomes employed  and  capital  accumulates.  At 
this stage, a world  excess supply  for German  goods develops, along  with 
increased  saving. This is shown by the shift to longer  term equilibrium 
at E". In the long run, the real exchange rate depreciates  (relative  to E, 
and especially E'), real interest rates decline toward  their initial  level, 
and  the German  trade  balance  improves  to generate  debt service. 
To date, the model has only been partly  successful in explaining  the 
short run effects of unification  on the western German  economy. Real 
interest rates have risen and Germany's  current  account has deterio- 
rated. But relative prices have not changed  to any extent, mostly be- 
cause the European  Monetary  System has made partner  countries  peg 
exchange  rates and suffer  a slowdown  in demand  during  periods  of high 
interest  rates.27  In Germany,  by contrast,  the lack of real  appreciation  in 
the currency  has translated  into a boom. 
Looking  ahead, the challenge  for German  economic policy is to ab- 
sorb a triple  shock:  financing  of consumption  smoothing  in the East; in- 
vestment in the East; and an increase in labor supply in the connected 
labor  markets.  Incomes policy and  fiscal  policy are the chief tools avail- 
able to cope with these challenges.  One strategy  would  be to raise taxes 
sharply,  cut domestic spending  in the West, and thus finance  both the 
transfers  and investment  at an unchanged  real exchange rate and real 
interest rate. Another strategy (in the extreme) would be pure debt fi- 
nance, including  crowding-out  by real appreciation  and high real inter- 
est rates. A third  strategy  would take a middle  road, using  incomes pol- 
icy, some taxation, and some borrowing  to avoid excess burdens of 
unification. 
What  should  be the public  policy toward  financing  the East: debt or 
taxes? The correct  view is that  rebuilding  eastern  Germany  is an invest- 
ment  project-including part  of the consumption  smoothing  in the East 
financed  by transfers.  Thus increasing  taxes moderately  and predomi- 
nantly  using debt finance  is the correct approach.  Over time, the debt 
ratio  will increase, as shown in figure  2 above, but it will settle down in 
a decade or so as transfers  come down. The situation  would look quite 
a bit like that  in the United States in the 1980s.  In both cases, the budget 
has  financed  an increase  in consumption.  The similarity  goes further:  the 
27. See Adams,  Alexander,  and  Gagnon  (1992). Rudiger Dornbusch and Holger  Wolf  259 
reduction  of transfers  to eastern Germany  is nowhere on the horizon, 
just as there  is no early  prospect  of raising  taxes (or cutting  spending)  to 
contain  the U.S. budget  deficit. 
Of course, some differences exist. First, western German  private 
saving  rates have not declined;  thus capital  formation  has not suffered 
as much  as in the United States. Second, even transfer  payments  can be 
interpreted  as part  of an investment  in a political  transition  that avoids 
divisive politics and  fosters a stable business environment. 
There is little doubt that economic prosperity  would happen  sooner 
in the East if a larger  fraction  of transfers  were saved and invested. But 
even that argument  must not be carried  too far. Part  of the reconstruc- 
tion of the East must  be the creation  of a service sector. It is hard  to see 
how a service sector would come into existence without  a substantially 
increasing  purchasing  power in the East. 
It remains to be seen how saving in the West and in the East will 
evolve as the economic  prospects  of the next decade come more  sharply 
into  focus. In the West, the prospect  of higher  taxes is clear. In the East, 
saving  should  increase  as the catch-up  on durables  that has taken place 
winds  down.28  Both these developments  will help limit  the crowding  out 
associated  with the budget  deficits. But they may not be enough  to offer 
the assurance  that high levels of investment  can exist in both the East 
and  in the West. 
Policy Prescriptions 
How can Germany  best cope with the reconstruction?29  One priority 
is to run  a high-pressure  economy in the West. That means  maintaining 
high  capacity  utilization;  this would serve as an incentive  to create new 
capacity, much of it in the East. A high-pressure  economy also would 
attract  migrants  and immigrants  from the East. That is presumably  the 
best way to turn  eastern  Germans  rapidly  into high  productivity  workers 
and  taxpayers. 
28. Western  Germany  offers  an interesting  test of Ricardian  equivalence.  Because  the 
West  has borne  a large  share  of the cost, consumption  should  have declined-unless one 
wants to argue  that improved  security and future peace dividends  sustain  the level of 
consumption. 
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The essential support  for such a strategy  must come from unions. A 
high-pressure  economy definitely  needs an incomes  policy. In the West, 
unions  must  agree  to wage demands  in line with productivity  growth  so 
that  there  is no need to fight  inflation  with high  interest  rates and unem- 
ployment.  Why should unions agree to control  wages? Because the al- 
ternative  is worse: they would have to pay far higher  taxes in the future 
because the East would remain  a welfare state, rather  than  becoming  a 
productive  region. Western  German  union members  as taxpayers  can- 
not escape the burden  of the East: either they must allow eastern Ger- 
mans  to compete  with  them  in the West or else they must  pay for eastern 
Germans  to stay in the East. Union members  ought  to have a strong  in- 
terest in minimizing  the cost of the operation. 
A special difficulty  arises from the need to finance  increased  invest- 
ment  in the East while consumption  is booming.  To complicate  matters 
further,  investment in the West cannot fall too much without causing 
western Germany  to lose competitiveness in world markets. If Feld- 
stein-Horioka  effects are not important,  so that increased  consumption 
spills  over into the current  account  rather  than  crowding  out investment, 
further  fiscal changes may not be needed. By contrast, if higher con- 
sumption  falls substantially  on domestic  goods, and if real appreciation 
is resisted  for sectoral  reasons, then fiscal  tightening  cannot  be avoided. 
The likely course is that the consumption  needs of the East, infra- 
structure  investment, and investment in business reconstruction  will 
amount  to a bill too high to be compatible  with strong  performance  in 
Germany's  traded  goods sector. Either  real wages will stop growing  for 
a while and create a cushion of profits  and investment,  or crowding-out 
will turn  into a fight  over income shares  that will derail  an already  diffi- 
cult situation.  Thus  unions  bear  a critical  responsibility  in spreading  the 
costs of adjustment  over time with minimal  crowding  out; this would 
present  the best prospects  for sustainable  real wage growth. 
In eastern Germany,  a very different  approach  is needed. Sustained 
subsidization  on the job is undesirable  because it demoralizes  workers 
and  retards  the urgent  task of modernization  and restructuring.  A better 
approach  is to pay unemployment  compensation,  provide  education  and 
training  premiums,  and create financing  vehicles for small businesses. 
Needless to say, stabilization  of the wage level in the East-or  at least a 
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One further  avenue must be explored. The end of communism  and 
unification  surely  changes  the security  outlook  and  dramatically  reduces 
the need for a strong defense posture. An immediate, major scaling 
down  of military  expenditures  and  a replacement  of the draft  by a volun- 
teer army  would release resources and reduce budget  pressures. Unifi- 
cation, rather  than  imposing  a large  tax on the West, could then yield a 
gain in income. However, without a major  reconsideration  of defense 
that  leads to substantial  savings, unification  will place a large  economic 
cost on the West for an extended  period. Comments 
and Discussion 
Lewis Alexander: I may not be the best person  to comment  on this pa- 
per  because  my views on this topic are  very close to those of the authors. 
I have a few disagreements  with the authors  regarding  economic devel- 
opments to date and their policy prescriptions.  The bulk of my com- 
ments, however, will attempt  to flesh out the argument  that  eastern  Ger- 
man income will converge to  the western German level  relatively 
quickly. 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Holger  Wolf  argue  that  the failure  to write  off 
the old debts of eastern  German  state-owned  enterprises  was a mistake. 
Such debts  can cause two problems  in the transformation  of Soviet-style 
et-style planned  economies. As the primary  asset on the consolidated 
balance  sheet of the banking  system, their  dubious  credit  quality  can be 
a major  obstacle to improving  the performance  of the financial  system. 
They also can complicate  the task of privatization. 
In other formerly socialist countries, these problems  have been al- 
lowed to persist  because they are expensive to resolve. A general  write- 
down of enterprise  debts must entail either the imposition  of losses on 
the main  creditors  of the banking  system (that  is, depositors)  or the issu- 
ance of new government  liabilities to replace the bad debts at a time 
when fiscal consolidation  is probably  the primary  policy goal. 
However, the special circumstances  of economic transition  in east- 
ern Germany  have meant that these problems have not arisen there. 
Monetary  union  was implemented  in such a way that  the government  of 
the Federal  Republic  effectively guaranteed  the liabilities  of the German 
Democratic Republic's banking  system.' Moreover, western German 
1.  See  "The Monetary Union with the German Democratic  Republic," Monthly Re- 
port of the Delutschle  Bundesbank, July 1990, pp. 13-28. 
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banks rapidly  took over most banking  activity in eastern Germany.  It 
also is difficult  to make  the case that these debts were a major  obstacle 
to privatization.  It is certainly  true that they have complicated  the task 
of the Treuhand  at a time when it was overextended. But the Treuhand 
has taken  over the debts of enterprises  when that  was necessary  to com- 
plete a sale, and  the Treuhand  has not lacked  financial  resources. 
Dornbusch  and  Wolf say relatively  little  about  the controversy  raised 
by George  Akerlof  and his coauthors  over the rapid  increase  of eastern 
German  wages.2  The essential question  is why eastern  German  workers 
demanded  large  wage increases in the face of a dramatic  decline in the 
demand  for eastern German  output. Dornbusch  and Wolf cite unions 
and  geography  as the principal  culprits.  But  the role of the government  is 
probably  just as important.  First of all, the extension of generous  social 
insurance schemes to eastern Germany  has largely insulated eastern 
German  incomes from  the sharp  decline in the demand  for eastern  Ger- 
man  labor.  In addition,  the German  government  initially  was the princi- 
pal shareholder  of most eastern  German  firms.  Wage negotiations  were 
fundamentally  imbalanced,  not because of union intransigence,  but be- 
cause management  (that is, the German  government)  was firmly  com- 
mitted  to a rapid  increase  in incomes in eastern  Germany. 
This also helps explain why the wage subsidy scheme proposed by 
Akerlof  and  others  was not more  widely  considered  in Germany.  In prin- 
ciple, one could imagine the German  government  pursuing  structural 
policies aimed at generating  productivity  growth in eastern Germany, 
while at the same time implementing  a policy aimed  at restraining  wage 
growth  as an obstacle  to adjustment.  But such a combination  of policies, 
with its distinctions  between means and ends, was probably  politically 
infeasible  for a government  that remains  committed  to raising  income 
levels in eastern  Germany. 
Dornbusch  and  Wolf's analysis  of how the costs of unification  should 
be financed  ignores the impact of German  fiscal policy on other coun- 
tries, particularly  those in the European  Monetary  System (EMS). Ger- 
man unification  generated  a demand shock that was concentrated  in 
Germany.  German  monetary  policy tightened  in response. Other  EMS 
countries were affected through two channels. German imports in- 
creased sharply,  but they also had to increase  interest  rates to maintain 
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their  nominal  exchange  rates  vis-'a-vis  the deutsche  mark.  The net effect 
may  have  been  negative.3  The trade  balances  of the other  EMS  countries 
with  Germany  have improved  significantly,  but  their  total  trade  balances 
have  declined.  Part  of this discrepancy  is caused  by the increased  cost of 
oil imports.  But it also suggests  that the negative  impact  of higher  EMS 
interest rates, and the resulting appreciation  of EMS currencies, on 
trade  flows has largely  offset the direct stimulus  generated  by stronger 
German imports. This, in combination with the negative impact of 
higher  interest rates on domestic demand, suggests that German  unifi- 
cation  has depressed  growth  in other  EMS countries. 
Clearly  a moderation  of wage demands  by western German  unions, 
which Dornbusch  and Wolf advocate, would help to mitigate  the nega- 
tive impact of unification  on other EMS countries. But German  fiscal 
policy has made  this problem  worse. The decision to finance  unification 
largely  with borrowing  has intensified  the demand  shock concentrated 
on Germany  and  with it, the negative  spillovers  to other  EMS  countries. 
If German  policymakers  take  into account  the impact  of their  policies on 
other countries, as surely they should, then the case for borrowing  to 
finance  unification  is far  from  overwhelming. 
On the question  of convergence, Dornbusch  and Wolf identify  three 
sources of productivity  growth:  the introduction  of market  incentives; 
the transfer  of knowledge  and  technology;  and  investment.  The authors 
argue  that  productivity  growth  in eastern  Germany  is likely to be faster 
than in other reforming,  formerly  socialist economies. They stress the 
fact that the transfer  of knowledge and technology will be more rapid 
because of the high  level of western  German  investment  in eastern  Ger- 
many, as well as cultural  and linguistic  linkages to western Germany. 
Moreover, they argue that investment  in eastern Germany  will not be 
constrained  by Feldstein-Horioka  effects. I would  like to bolster  the au- 
thors' basic conclusion by presenting  evidence that the potential  pro- 
ductivity  gain from  the introduction  of market  incentives is large. I will 
also offer some simple  quantitative  evidence about  the potential  contri- 
bution  of investment  to a rapid  convergence. 
3.  Two factors dampened the negative impact on Germany's  EMS trading partners. 
The increasing integration of European goods markets enhanced the positive impact gen- 
erated through German imports.  Interest rate differentials between  Germany and other 
countries have declined over the last two years; this has dampened the impact of tighter 
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The introduction  of the incentives  of a market  system in eastern  Ger- 
many  is likely  to generate  a significant  increase  in productivity.  Another 
way of looking  at this question is to ask whether  it is reasonable  to as- 
sume  that  the inefficiencies  of the old socialist system manifested  them- 
selves only in fixed  capital.  If the answer  to this question  is yes, then the 
per capita  output  deficit  in the GDR  was due solely to the low level and 
poor  quality  of investment.  But surely  the lack of appropriate  incentives 
in the old system caused resources other than capital  to be used ineffi- 
ciently. The elimination  of these other inefficiencies,  which can be cor- 
rected without further investment, is a source of rapid productivity 
growth. 
A precedent  for rapid  convergence  of this type exists in the economic 
reconstruction  of West Germany  following World  War  II.4 During  the 
first phase of the postwar economic "miracle,"  from roughly 1947 to 
1950  or 1951, economic activity increased  extremely rapidly  as output 
returned  to prewar  levels. But the utilization  of inputs,  measured  in con- 
ventional  ways, changed  little during  this period, implying  dramatic  in- 
creases in productivity.  In first  few years following  the end of the war, 
economic  activity  was held down by a variety  of factors:  the absence of 
money as a means of exchange  because of a severe repressed  inflation; 
an outmoded system of economic controls; and fundamental  uncer- 
tainty  over basic property  rights  and  the economic system to be adopted 
in postwar West Germany.s  The productivity  gain observed in West 
Germany  between 1947  and 1950-roughly 50 percent in the industrial 
sector-can  be attributed  to the elimination  of these factors.6 
In postwar West Germany, it was relatively easy to rectify these 
problems-and reap  the resulting  increase  in productivity-because the 
essential  framework  of a market  economy (that  is, a system of commer- 
cial law and private ownership  of most economic assets) still existed. 
There  is no question  that  it will take  longer  to realize  the analogous  gains 
in productivity  in eastern Germany-and other reforming  countries  - 
because the institutional  transformation  that  is needed is so much  more 
4.  The discussion of the postwar economic  performance of western Germany is based 
on Alexander (1991). 
5.  War damage was relatively unimportant. Wartime additions to the capital stock far 
outweighed war damage and allies' dismantling. 
6.  It is worth noting that the allied occupation of West Germany delayed recovery.  In 
spite of similar declines,  industrial production in West Germany did not return to prewar 
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extensive. However, that does not imply that such gains will not ulti- 
mately  be achieved. 
Some data already  indicate  that productivity  is increasing  rapidly  in 
eastern  Germany.  Output  per hour  in the industrial  sector is reported  to 
have increased 76 percent between January  and December of 1991.7 
This increase  in productivity  was accounted  for almost  exclusively by a 
decline in hours  worked,  with virtually  no change  in the level of output. 
Undoubtedly  some of the decline  in hours  worked  was merely  a delayed 
response  of labor  demand  to the sharp  drop  in eastern  German  industrial 
production  in the second half of 1990.  But it also may be the first con- 
crete evidence of the benefits  of economic reform  in eastern  Germany. 
The fact that  output  did not increase  must  at least partly  reflect  the com- 
bination  of the extreme openness of the eastern German  economy and 
the rapid  increase in wages. In fact, the increase in labor productivity 
just offset the increase in wages, so that unit labor costs were little 
changed.8  Had wages not increased  so much, and or had some mecha- 
nism such as an exchange rate depreciation  or tariff  been available  to 
divert  eastern  German  demand  away from  foreign  products,  surely  this 
increase  in productivity  would have resulted  in an increase  in output. 
Dornbusch  and Wolf point out that investment in eastern Germany 
need not be constrained  by Feldstein-Horioka  effects and thus a rapid 
investment-driven  convergence  of income levels is possible. However, 
the authors  make  no attempt  to quantify  this effect. I would  like to offer 
some very tentative  quantitative  evidence on this point. 
First  of all, investment  in eastern  Germany  is increasing  rapidly.  Real 
gross fixed  investment  is estimated  to have increased  18  percent  in 1991; 
it is expected to increase  26 percent  in 1992.  Perhaps  the best indicator 
is the level of investment  per employee in eastern Germany  compared 
with western  Germany.  This measure  increased  from  37 percent  in 1990 
to 52 percent in 1991;  it is expected to increase to 78 percent in 1992.9 
Western German  firms operating  in eastern Germany, which are ex- 
pected to account for about half of all investment  in eastern  Germany, 
are expected to invest roughly  the same amount  per employee in both 
regions this year. 10 
7.  See Wochenbericht, 12-13/92 (March 19, 1992). 
8.  See Wochenber-icht, 12-13/92 (March 19, 1992). 
9.  See Wochenbericht, 16-17/92 (April 16, 1992). 
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If investment  per employee in eastern  and  western  Germany  remains 
the same for ten years, eastern German  labor productivity  will be 84 
percent  of the western German  level at the end of the period." In this 
back-of-the-envelope  calculation,  it is assumed  that  no autonomous  pro- 
ductivity  increase  occurs due to the transition  to a market  system. Fur- 
thermore,  rapid  capital  accumulation  in eastern  Germany  will mean  that 
the vintage of the eastern German  capital stock will be considerably 
newer  than  that  of western  Germany.  This also may increase  productiv- 
ity growth  in eastern  Germany  if a significant  portion  of technical  change 
is embodied  in the capital stock, as recent work for the United States 
suggests.  12 
In a recent paper, two colleagues and I used a medium  sized macro- 
economic model of the global economy to simulate  the impact  of Ger- 
man unification.'3  In doing so, we assumed that investment  in eastern 
Germany  will be determined  by the same  underlying  factors  and  param- 
eter estimates as investment  in western Germany.  The only difference 
between  eastern  and  western  Germany  in this simulation  is in their  initial 
capital  labor  ratios. The basic structure  of the model-the  Federal  Re- 
serve's MX3  model-is  analogous  to the basic structure  of the Barro  and 
Sala-i-Martin  model:  aggregate  supply  is modeled  using  a Cobb-Douglas 
production  function, and both consumption  and investment  are based 
on forward-looking,  model-consistent  expectations.  The simulations  es- 
timate  the rate of eastern  German  convergence  under  conditions  of ex- 
treme openness. Eastern German  investment is assumed to have the 
same access to German  savings as investment  in western Germany.  In 
addition,  the German  economy is assumed to be open in the conven- 
tional sense.  Unification generates a sharp real appreciation  of the 
deutsche  mark  and a sharp  decline in the German  current  account. The 
basic result  is that output  per worker  in eastern Germany  converges to 
the western  German  level at an average  rate of 14 percent  over the first 
15 years, compared  with Barro  and Sala-i-Martin's  estimate of a 2 per- 
cent convergence  rate across a cross section of regions. This suggests 
that a rapid  rate of convergence in eastern Germany,  driven  by invest- 
11.  Initially eastern German labor productivity is assumed to be one third of western 
German levels.  Other structural parameters are taken from Adams, Alexander,  and Gag- 
non (1992). 
12.  See Greenwood,  Hercowitz,  and Krusell (1992). 
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ment, does not require  implausible  movements  in global  savings  and in- 
vestment  balances. 
Dornbusch  and  Wolf  cite a number  of differences  between  the eastern 
German  case and  those analyzed  by Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin.  One  factor 
that  they do not mention  is the role of the German  government.  Govern- 
ment  transfers  to eastern  Germany  are  expected to be about  5 percent  of 
German  GNP this year, about one-third  of which will support  invest- 
ment.  14 It seems likely that  the supplies  of public  fixed capital  in the two 
regions of Germany  will converge more rapidly  than in the other cases 
analyzed  by Barro  and Sala-i-Martin. 
General Discussion 
Much  of the discussion  centered  on the sources of economic growth, 
as well as on the relevance of general  models and evidence on conver- 
gence to the special  case of convergence  between the "two"  Germanys. 
Susan Collins  pointed  out that in the case of eastern  Germany,  not only 
is a reallocation  of factors taking  place, but a rapid  transfer  of technol- 
ogy is also occurring,  which the standard  models do not assume. This 
may  result  in much  more  rapid  convergence  than  the cross-country  stud- 
ies suggest. Collins  added  that  part  of the convergence  might  come from 
a slowdown  in growth  in western  Germany,  as its capacity  to absorb  im- 
migrants  from  the East diminishes.  Holger  Wolf  found  it useful  to distin- 
guish three sources of convergence:  first, the move to the production- 
possibility frontier  with existing factor supplies; second, the replace- 
ment of existing factor supplies with state-of-the-art  technology; and 
third, the expansion of factor supplies, through  high investment  rates. 
The first source would be common to all the centrally  planned  econo- 
mies now in transition  to market economies. However, eastern Ger- 
many is likely to have a substantial  advantage  in the second and third 
areas  because of its special  access to western  German  resources. 
Panelists suggested several possible precedents. William  Nordhaus 
remarked that convergence was  relatively slow  in the postbellum 
growth  of the northern  and  southern  states of the United States. Stanley 
Fischer suggested  that  a more  relevant  example  of integration  might  be 
14.  See "Public Financial Transfers to Eastern Germany in 1991 and 1992," Monthly 
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the rapid  removal  of barriers  between Israel  and  the occupied  territories 
after  the 1967  war. Initially,  convergence  was rapid,  largely  as the result 
of labor  migration.  Per capita  income in the occupied territories  nearly 
doubled in five years. Then convergence essentially stopped. Robert 
Shiller suggested  that recovery from the 1906  earthquake  in San Fran- 
cisco might  also provide  evidence of catch-up  time between two closely 
related  entities when the capital  stock of one had  been destroyed. 
Shiller  questioned  the appropriateness  of using models that  typically 
assume  low labor  migration  when the relatively  small  geographic  size of 
eastern Germany  and the location of Berlin as an enclave in its center 
mean that most workers  can commute  to work in the western sections 
without  changing  their  place of residence. Thus  the reallocation  of labor 
should  occur much  faster in the case of German  unification  than  a stan- 
dard  regional  model  would  predict.  Wolf  observed  that  these same con- 
siderations  suggest  that  a low-wage  strategy  for eastern  Germany  would 
have been unsustainable.  Henry Aaron, following the older develop- 
ment  literature,  suggested  that  the key issue in the convergence  process 
is how long eastern  Germany  will take to reach  western  capital-labor  ra- 
tios; if capital-labor  ratios equalize, so will the other important  eco- 
nomic variables.  However, Martin  Baily added  that  the standard  analy- 
sis is not a good guide to how quickly any of this would happen in 
Germany. There, the process of economic development has to do 
mostly with the shift from a largely  agricultural,  primitive  economy to- 
ward  a more  modern  commercial  economy, rather  than  with conversion 
of a more industrialized,  but centrally  planned, economy to a market 
economy. Baily also noted that, while it might  appear  from  the high  rate 
of investment  in eastern  Germany  that  the return  to capital  is high, most 
of the investment is flowing into residential  construction, rather  than 
into industrial  capital. 
Lawrence  Katz suggested  that  German  unification  will provide  a test 
case for two different  views of how rapid  wage increases will affect the 
transition.  The first, the "Charles  Murray"  view, says that simultane- 
ously paying  people higher  wages and increasing  the generosity of un- 
employment  insurance  will have little effect on productivity.  Thus in- 
creases in real wages in the East will lead to persistent  unemployment 
and  require  western  Germany  to transfer  resources  to the East  for a long 
time. The second  view, the more  optimistic  "Akerlof-Yellen"  view, sees 
higher  wages as a type of gift-exchange  that will call forth  much  greater 270  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
work  effort  and  produce  much  more  rapid  convergence. Katz suggested 
that  Puerto  Rico and  the north  of England  are  persistently  depressed  re- 
gions consistent with the first view. He argued  that it remained  to be 
seen whether  eastern  Germany  would  fulfill  the optimistic  Akerlof-Yel- 
len expectations. Rudiger Dornbusch and Holger  Wolf  271 
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